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The strategic importance of information policy for the contemporary neoliberal state: 
the case of Open Government Data in the United Kingdom 
1. Introduction 
Information policy has been claimed as a key tool in the exercise of state power that 
has increased in significance substantially over the last 30-40 years, resulting in the 
GHYHORSPHQWRIDQ³LQIRUPDWLRQDOVWDWH´(Braman, 2006). This periodization aligns with the 
era of neoliberalization; the political economic model that is currently in crisis. This suggests 
that information policy could be a potentially important site of power and struggle in the 
response to current political and economic crises. In the UK, it is widely recognised that a 
³YHU\DFWLYHSHULRGRIVFUXWLQ\ZLWKLQWKHJRYHUQPHQWRIWKH8.¶VQDWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQ
SROLF\´EHJDQDURXQG(Saxby, 2011, p. 1), the same year as the first indications of 
economic crisis developed. Whilst this increase in information policy activity was not the 
direct outcome of the evolving economic crisis, the interrelations between the development of 
information policy and political responses to the crises during this period should be explored. 
The aim of this article is to begin to analyse in what ways information policy has 
SOD\HGDVWUDWHJLFUROHLQWKHUHVSRQVHRIWKH8.¶VFHQWUH-right coalition (Conservative-
Liberal) government to the current political economic crisis since coming to power in 2010, 
and to relatHWKHVHILQGLQJVWR%UDPDQ¶V(2006) claim regarding the development of an 
³LQIRUPDWLRQDOVWDWH´)RFXVLQJVSHFLILFDOO\RQWKHFDVHRIWKH2SHQ*RYHUQPHQW'DWD2*'
policy initiative in the United Kingdom, the article analyses the development of OGD policy 
by the UK Government during the period 2010 to 2013 as it responded to deepening crises 
and engaged in efforts to push ahead with a neoliberal agenda. Drawing primarily on analysis 
of policy documentation and interviews with UK policy makers and OGD advocates, and a 
theoretical framework rooted in critical political economy, the article analyses the 
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intersection of OGD policy with major public policy initiatives of the current government: 
the Transparency Agenda, the Open Public Services Agenda, the privatization of key public 
assets, and the economic growth strategy. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The first section outlines the research 
methods used to generate the empirical data on which the arguments are based. The second 
section introduces the analytical framework for exploring this data, with an exploration of 
NH\WUHQGVZLWKLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH8.¶VQHROLEHUDOVWDWHUHOHYDQWWRWKH2*'SROLF\
initiative. This section also makes the case for the importance of information systems and 
policy to the process of neoliberalization. The third section introduces the concept of Open 
*RYHUQPHQW'DWDDQGSURYLGHVDEULHIRYHUYLHZRIWKH8.¶V2*'LQLWLDWLYHLQFOXGLQJWKH
legislative framework that it exists within. The fourth section outlines the findings of the 
research, presenting a thematic analysis of the political economic agenda that the UK 
government are developing through the opening up of government data. The article concludes 
by arguing the case for the strategic importance of information policy for the neoliberal state 
EDVHGRQWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVHWRUHFHQWSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFFULVHV\HWTXHVWLRQV
WKHIUDPLQJRIWKHVHREVHUYDWLRQVVROHO\LQWHUPVRIWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDQ³LQIRUPDWLRQDO
VWDWH´(Braman, 2006). 
2. Research methods 
The arguments made in this article are based on research undertaken during a larger 
research project on the politics of Open Government Data in the United Kingdom. Data were 
collected via in depth interviews with UK based civil society OGD advocates (11 interviews 
± µFRUH¶DGYRFDWHVZKRKDGDWVRPHSRLQWXQGHUWDNHQDQRIILFLDOUROHDGYLVLQJWKH8.
JRYHUQPHQWRQ2SHQ'DWDRU3XEOLF6HFWRU,QIRUPDWLRQWKHUHVWµSHULSKHUDO¶DGYRFDWHV
senior civil servants with policy responsibility for OGD (4 interviews), local government 
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officials working on OGD projects (5 interviews) and one interview with a representative of 
the corporate public sector information re-use industry. This interview data was 
complemented by a series of observations of 5 local, 5 national and 3 international OGD 
events; a content analysis of the open-government@okfn.org mailing list which has a strong 
presence of UK based OGD advocates; a policy analysis of all UK national government OGD 
related policy documentation and advice published between 2009 and 2012; and a review of 
published policy documentation and research on the re-use of public sector information in the 
UK and Europe. The data collected aimed to gain understanding of the development of the 
OGD initiative, including the ideas and activities of advocates, and how the state-based actors 
engaged with the phenomenon and responded to the ideas put forward by OGD advocates. 
A thematic analysis was undertaken of the collected data and the following themes 
were identified from interviews, observations and mailing list content analysis: 
x Developing an OGD community  
x Developing an OGD technical and information infrastructure 
x Building alliances between civil society, state and industry  
x Ideational constructs of civil society OGD advocates 
Social and economic ends; Democratic participation; Political crises; Public 
sector governance; Promoting innovation; Equality in economic production 
x Ideational constructs of OGD advocates in the state and industry 
Trust in politicians and the state; Citizen participation and engagement; 
Citizen-consumer choice; PSI Re-use market liberalization 
The thematic analysis of OGD policy documentation also identified the following themes:  
x Public services marketization (Open Public Services) 
x Economic growth 
x Transparency 
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This article reports on a subsection of this larger research project, specifically the 
DGRSWLRQRI2*'SROLF\E\WKH8.µVFHQWUH-right coalition government during the period 
May 2010 - 2013. Thus, the analysis is focused thematically on the ideational constructs of 
OGD advocates in the UK state, and themes emerging in UK national government OGD 
policy documentation. 
Due to the sensitive political nature of some of the discussions all interviews were 
FDUULHGRXWRQWKHFRQGLWLRQRILQWHUYLHZHHV¶DQRQ\PLW\,QWHUYLHZGDWDUHIHUUHGWRLQWKH
body of the article is therefore cited with reference to the category of interviewee (e.g., 
Peripheral Civil Society), rather than individual names or identifiers. 
3. Neoliberalism and information policy  
As leading British political economists Hay and Payne (2013) recently stressed, 
³SROLWLFDOHFRQRP\DQDO\VLVLVFRQWHQWLRXVVWXII:HGRQ¶WHYHUVWDQGRQHVSHFLDOO\ILUP
ground. We make judgements, and then see how events unfold, adjusting our thinking as we 
JR´S,QOLJKWRIWKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHFULWLFDOSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\DSSURDFKWKDt is 
adopted in this article, an analytical framework, grounded primarily in research by British 
political economists, will be outlined in order to explicitly underline the approach to the 
analysis of key themes emerging in the empirical data.  
The era of neoliberalization is widely understood to have developed during the 
structural crisis of the Keynesian welfare state in the 1970s as interest grew in the ideas of 
economists such as Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman. Within the space of a few 
years during the 1970s, the ideas of these neoliberal economists began to draw more 
widespread support as an answer to the perceived failings of the Keynesian model in 
institutions such as the OECD, World Bank, IMF, and the governments of the UK and USA 
(Crouch, 2011, p. 15-6). Whilst a variety of neoliberalisms have unfolded in different locales, 
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and definitions of neoliberalism are therefore debated, a generally agreed criteria is a 
preference for market forces over other, particularly state based, forms of economic 
organisation and management. Nevertheless, state intervention in fashioning the conditions 
for this market-orientated economic model has generally been a key feature of neoliberal 
governance in practice (Saad-Filho & Johnson, 2005, p. 4).  
Crouch (2011, p. 61) argues that neoliberal economists are generally interested in 
increasing the overall level of wealth in an economy via market forces; however they have 
WHQGHGWREH³H[SOLFLWO\XQLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIWKLVZHDOWK´,ITXHVWLRned on the 
issue of wealth distribution, the general proposition has tended to be that the resulting 
economic growth will enhance the general level of wellbeing in society as a whole due to 
µWULFNOH-GRZQ¶HIIHFWV$OWKRXJKUHFHQW\HDUVKDYHVHHQLQWHUQDWLRnal organisations place 
increasing emphasis on global poverty reduction and development, the same period has also 
witnessed an increase in global economic inequality (Harvey, 2007, p. 17). Economic 
inequality has also increased at the national level in neoliberal states. This trend began during 
the early 1980s in the UK and USA, and in many other countries from the late 1980s, as 
neoliberal economic policies were implemented, resulting in the incomes of the wealthiest 
rising at a faster rate than the poorest (OECD, 2011). The problem of economic inequality in 
the UK has also become more deeply entrenched during the recent economic crisis (Wren-
Lewis, 2013; Randeep, 2011). 
Recent research suggests that a lack of focus on redistribution has had a significant 
negative impact on many apparently wealthy societies in terms of both general wellbeing 
(Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010) and economic growth and efficiency (Stiglitz, 2012). It is clear 
that for many researchers in this field deepening inequality is not simply a moral issue, but 
one of social and economic inefficacy. This research thus suggests serious failings in the 
basic factors of neoliberal economic development.  
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Despite these weaknesses in the basic propositions, a neoliberal logic has become 
dominant within economic governance in the UK (and elsewhere to a greater or lesser extent) 
over recent decades. This process has been actualised in a variety of ways, including, but not 
limited to, efforts to expand the commodification of information (May, 2006); the 
deregulation (and, some argue, reregulation) and subsequent growth of the financial services 
industry (Duménil & Lévy 2005; Major, 2012); the introduction of New Public Management 
practices to the public sector (Le Grand, 2007); and, a hollowing out of democratic forums 
and increasing political power for global economic elites (Murphy, 2000). Whilst OGD, 
VLPLODUWRRWKHUµRSHQLQLWLDWLYHV¶FDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVDVKLIWDZD\IURPWKHUHVWULFWLYHIRUPV
of information commodification that deepened during the neoliberal era, in order to 
XQGHUVWDQGEHWWHUWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ2*'DQGWKH8.¶VHYROYLQJQHROLEHUDOVWDWHLWLV
crucial to appreciate the emergence of OGD within this broader context of neoliberalization. 
The neoliberal preference for market based economies combined with competitive 
pressure from the US financial sector, resulted in UK government policies since the 1980s 
until recently to deregulate the financial markets (Hay, 2013a). As Duménil and Lévy (2005, 
p. 10) observe, thiVOHGWR³WKHGUDPDWLFJURZWKRIILQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´DQG³WKH
implementation of new relationships between the financial and non-financial sector, to the 
EHQHILWRIWKHIRUPHU´$VPDQ\%ULWLVKSROLWLFDOHFRQRPLVWVKDYHDUJXHGWKH8.¶VJURZWK
model during this period became increasingly dependent upon the financial sector (Hay, 
2013b; Gamble, 2009; Thompson, ZLWKDURXQGRIWKH8.¶V*URVV9DOXH$GGHG
coming from the financial and insurance sector in 2011 (Berry, 2013, p. 15). Financial market 
innovation in the UK, and elsewhere, led to a deepening process of financialization through 
the development of a range of new financial products; one example being the weather 
derivative which ZLOOEHDQDO\VHGLQUHODWLRQWRWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶V2SHQ*RYHrnment 
Data policy below. This shift in the economic structure of the UK economy led to a 
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significant accumulation of political and economic power by the financial industries; a 
process that deepened as high levels of public spending from the late 1990s became 
dependent upon tax revenues being generated from the sector (Coates, 2009, p. 425).  
Further market orientated developments during this era can also be seen across the 
8.¶VSXEOLFVHFWRURIWHQUHVXOWLQJIURPWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI1HZ3XEOLF0DQDJHPHQW(NPM) 
practices. The implementation of NPM practices have impacted significantly upon the 
governance of the public sector. In line with the neoliberal predisposition to enforce the 
market form in all contexts, NPM aims to impose the competitive logic of the private sector 
into the governance of the public sector. For NPM advocates, such practices should 
µPRGHUQLVH¶SXEOLFVHUYLFHVWKDWDUHGHHPHGXQUHVSRQVLYHWRDQGUHPRWHIURPXVHUVDQG
dominated by the interests of public sector workers who are producing inefficient and 
sometimes unneeded services at a high cost to the tax-payer (Crouch, 2011, p. 77). It is 
proposed by advocates of NPM that market-orientated management will lead to higher levels 
of quality and efficiency in public service provision (Le Grand, 2007).  
In the case of the UK, ideas about New Public Management have been realised in a 
number of ways, including the increased fragmentation of public service provision through 
outsourcing, privatization and other forms of decentralization, and the institutionalization of 
competitive processes both within public bodies and between a variety of providers in the 
public, private and third sectors. Thus, whilst public spending increased during this period, 
some of which was funded by increasing tax revenue from the financial sector, much of this 
has flowed to private interests as providers of, or investors in, public services. For example, 
RYHUUHFHQW\HDUVPXFKLQIUDVWUXFWXUDOLQYHVWPHQWLQWKH8.¶VSXEOLFVHUYLFHVKDVEHHQ
funded by the Private Finance Initiative (Berry, 2013, p. 6), a highly lucrative form of 
investment for private interests that provides substantial returns from taxpayers over the next 
few decades far beyond the initial investment.  Further, the users of these public services 
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have beHQLQFUHDVLQJO\FRQVWUXFWHGDVµFLWL]HQ-FRQVXPHUV¶UHTXLULQJDUDQJHRILQIRUPDWLRQ
on the quality of services in order to enhance their position in the market, and the driver of 
quality service provision has shifted away from the notion of professional and public service 
ethics to targets and financial incentives (Crouch, 2011, p. 71-96).  
The empowerment of large corporate and financial interests within the broader 
context of neoliberal globalization has also led to concentrations of power amongst economic 
elites in the shaping of many regulatory and decision making processes (Bowman et al., 
2013).  This growing concentration of political power correlates with a long term decline in 
public trust for democratic institutions of state in the UK (Dalton, 2004). Since 1987, for 
example the British Social Attitudes survey reports a significant decline in people reporting 
they trust government just about always or most of the time from a high 37% in 1987 to a low 
of 16% in 2009 (Park et al., 2010). Whilst the 2009 Expenses Scandal in which a large 
number of Members of Parliament in the UK were found to be engaged in widespread, and 
sometimes illegal, abuse of their expenses system, will have likely impacted upon this result, 
similarly low figures are reported during earlier years since 2000. The survey also reports that 
³WUHQGVLQSROLWLFDOHIILFDF\KDYHEHHQVLPLODUWRWKRVHIRUSROLWLFDOWUXVW/HYHOVRIHIILFDF\
KDYHWHQGHGWREHORZHUVLQFHWKDQWKH\ZHUHSUHYLRXVO\´3DUNHWDO7KHVXUYH\
also reports declining trust in the financial sector since before the crisis, from 90% of people 
LQEHOLHYLQJ8.EDQNVDUHZHOOUXQWRLQWRLQ³SUREDEO\WKH
biggest change in public attitudes ever recorded by the British Social Attitudes VHULHV´3DUN
et al., 2010).  
These combined factors of financialization, New Public Management, and anti-
democratic concentrations of political power amongst economic elites have led many to 
PRXQWDFULWLTXHRIQHROLEHUDOLVPDVEHLQJDSURFHVVRIµKROORZLQJRXWWKHVWDWH¶DQGLWV
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potential for instituting democratic and values driven forms of governance, in favour of a 
form of governance driven by an austere market logic. 
The importance of information and its governance to this process of neoliberalization 
at both the global and national levels has long been recognised (Webster, 2006; Harvey, 
2007). Exploring the relationship between information and power further, Braman (2011, p. 
2) DUJXHVWKDWVLQFHWKHVZHKDYHZLWQHVVHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDQ³LQIRUPDWLRQDO
VWDWH´DIRUPRIVWDWHLQZKLFK³JRYHUQPHQWVGHOLEHUDWHO\H[SOLFLWO\DQGFRQVLVWHQWO\FRQWURO
LQIRUPDWLRQFUHDWLRQSURFHVVLQJIORZVDQGXVHWRH[HUFLVHSRZHU´7KLV³LQIRUPDWLRQDO´
IRUPRISRZHUVKHDUJXHVLQWHUDFWVZLWKRWKHUIRUPVRISRZHUE\³PDQLSXODWLQJWKH
LQIRUPDWLRQDOEDVHVRILQVWUXPHQWDOVWUXFWXUDODQGV\PEROLFSRZHU´Braman, 2006, p. 25). 
:KLOVWWKH86$%UDPDQDUJXHVLVWKH³SURWRW\SLFDOH[DPSOHRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQDOVWDWH´
similar developments have occurred across a range of other countries, including the UK 
ZKLFKVKHGHVFULEHVDV³ULIH´ZLWK³H[SHULPHQWDWLRQZLWKQHZW\SHVRILQIRUPDWLRQSROLF\
WRROV´Braman, 2006, p. 36-7). 
This body of research sugJHVWVWKDWWKHUHLVDSDUWLFXODUIRUPRI³LQIRUPDWLRQDO
SRZHU´WKDWKDVGHYHORSHGGXULQJWKHSHULRGRIQHROLEHUDOL]DWLRQ,WLVWKHUHIRUHWLPHO\WR
explore the possible role that information policy is playing in neoliberal responses to the 
political economic crises that have unfolded in the UK over recent years. The following 
analysis of the case of Open Government Data policy in the United Kingdom will illustrate 
WKDWWKHUHLVDVWURQJDUJXPHQWWREHPDGHIRUDSSUHFLDWLQJWKH³VWUDWHJLFLPSRUWDQFH´
(Braman, 2011, p. 2) of information policy in the exercising of state power by political actors 
DLPLQJWRSURJUHVVNH\FRPSRQHQWVRIWKH8.¶VQHROLEHUDOSURMHFWWKURXJKWKHFXUUHQWFULVHV 
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4. Open Government Data  
Open Government Data is an information policy which provides a particular 
framework for governing the re-use by third parties of datasets that are produced by public 
institutions. In the UK, datasets produced by public bodies include major datasets such as 
mapping, meteorological, land use, public transport, company registration data, and 
government spending data, as well as smaller datasets such as the geo-locations of local 
council services. The proposal for Open Government Data argues that non-personal data that 
is produced by public bodies should be opened for all to re-use, free of charge, and without 
discrimination.  
:KLOVWJRYHUQPHQWV¶LQWHUHVWLQWKHUH-use of public sector information has been an 
on-going and important, if relatively arcane, policy domain since the 1980s, by 2009 Open 
Government Data was becoming a key national policy initiative in both the UK and USA. In 
June 2009, during a period of political and economic crisis for the UK government with the 
unfolding of the MPs Expenses Scandal and the financial crisis, Sir Tim Berners Lee and 
Professor Nigel Shadbolt both innovators in the field of Web Science and strong advocates of 
OGD, were appointed as Information Advisors to the UK Government. By the end of the 
summer, these appointments had led to a beta interface for data.gov.uk ± the 8.¶VQHZ2*'
portal ± being produced and shared with developers, prior to the portal going public in 
January 2010. 
Many civil society advocates of opening up public datasets have tended to frame the 
impact of OGD as a significant democratization project counter to neoliberal hegemony, 
which could also generate significant digital innovation and, resultantly, economic  growth 
(Bates, 2012, 2013). This discourse is also strong in much of the popular and research 
literature on OGD. For example, a range of contributors make such a case for OGD in 
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/DWKURSDQG5XPD¶VHGLWHGERRNRQ2SHQ*RYHUQPHQW/LQGHUVS
positions OGD as part of a developing public governance framework through which the 
³JRYHUQPHQWWUHDWVWKHSXEOLFQRWDVFXVWRPHUVEXWDVSDUWQHUV´YLDPXOWL-faceted forms of 
³FLWL]HQFR-SURGXFWLRQ´IXHOOHGE\WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIQHZRQOLQHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV
technologies. Saxby (2011) similarly argues that OGD marks a shift in government thinking 
WR³LQYLWHEURDGHUSXEOLFSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQGHOLYHU\RISROLF\´S7KLVSHUFHLYHGYDOXHRI
2*'LVDOVRIRXQGLQSUDFWLWLRQHUSXEOLFDWLRQVIRUH[DPSOH+XLMERRPDQG%URHN¶V
FODLPWKDW2*'FRXOGFRQWULEXWHWR³IRVWHULQJLQQRYDWLRQDQGVWUHQJWKHQLQJGHPRFUDWLF
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ«>DQG@HQKDQFLQJODZHQIRUFHPHQW´ 
However, a number of more sceptical analyses have also been published, whose 
authors, whilst not necessarily negating the potential of OGD in developing more open forms 
of governance, argue for a less idealised interpretation more grounded in the broader political 
and social context. For example, Yu and Robinson (2012) argue that Open Government Data 
based transparency initiatives may give governments a way to increase their credibility on the 
world stage, without actually implementing any policies to increase accountability. Longo 
(2011) has questioned the motivations of politicians engaging with the OGD agenda, 
hypothesisinJWKDW³VRPHDGYRFDWHV«DUHPRWLYDWHGE\EHOLHIVERWKH[SOLFLWDQG
XQFRQVFLRXVIRUJHGLQWKH1HZ3XEOLF0DQDJHPHQW130UHIRUPDJHQGD´DQG%DWHV
(2013) raises similar questions in an analysis of the relationship between civil society and 
state-based OGD advocates in the UK. 
There is much to be gained from understanding the emergence and adoption of an 
initiative such as OGD within its broader social context. The following section presents key 
research findings of the thematic analysis of the strategic benefits of OGD policy as 
SHUFHLYHGE\VWDWHEDVHGDFWRUVDLPLQJWRUHSURGXFHWKH8.¶VQHROLEHUDOIRUPRIVWDWH.H\
themes to be explored are trust and transparency, the marketization of public services, the 
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privatization of public assets, and efforts to leverage financial market growth in the 
exploitation of societal risks. 
5. Open Government Data and the reproduction of the neoliberal state 
5.1 Transparency and the construction of trust in neoliberal governance  
The crisis of legitimacy, and that I think is a fundamental backdrop to all of this 
>2*'LQWKH8.@IURPDSROLWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH«With government reiterating that still 
as a motivation « in the last couple of weeks [February-March 2011] (Interviews: 
Peripheral Civil Society).  
During the period of OGD policy adoption in the UK, the government was facing a 
significant crisis of legitimacy due to a variety of political and economic crises. As the civil 
VRFLHW\2*'DGYRFDWHTXRWHGDERYHREVHUYHVDOPRVWD\HDULQWRWKHQHZJRYHUQPHQW¶V
administration, policy makers at OGD events were still expressing concern about this crisis of 
legitimacy and exploring how OGD might be used to overcome it. As outlined in the methods 
section, civil society OGD advocates framed their support for OGD in relation to a range of 
social, political and economic objectives, however for some of them OGD was part of their 
UHVSRQVHWRWKLVEURDGHUEUHDNGRZQRIOHJLWLPDF\IRUWKH8.¶VSROLWLFDOHVWDEOLVKPHQW)RU
many peripheral OGD advocates, significant levels of frustration with, and distrust in, the 
8.¶VSROLWLFDOHVWDEOLVKPHQWZHUHH[SUHVVHG 
(YHQWVGXULQJWKH8.¶VLQYDVLRQRI,UDTLQZHUHFLWHGE\RQHFLYLOVRFLHW\
advocate as the point when they realised they could no longer have faith in British 
democracy. More recently, the Parliamentary Expenses Scandal of 2009 was also cited by 
four peripheral advocates as an important factor in their, or others, understanding of the 
importance of OGD. One advocate also pre-HPSWHGWKH³SKRQH-KDFNLQJ´VFDQGDO-12), 
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which implicated VHFWLRQVRIWKH8.¶VPHGLDSROLWLFDOHOLWHVDQGWKH0HWURSROLWDQ3ROLFH
Force in a range of unethical relationships and corrupt practices, with a critique of the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHPHGLDSROLWLFVDQGEXVLQHVV³7KHPHGLDPDFKLQHZKLFKVHUYHVWKH
political machine, which serves the business machine, and there is no place for people there. 
$QGWKLVLVZKDW,UHEHOWRDQGILQGGLVJXVWLQJ´,QWHUYLHZ3HULSKHUDO&LYLO6RFLHW\$
number of OGD advocates also articulated a sense of disquiet about the political handling of 
the economic crisis which began in 2008, and concerns were articulated about the current 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VHIIRUWWRFRQQHFW2*'WRWKHLUDJHQGDRIFXWWLQJSXEOLFVHUYLFHIXQGLQJ 
There was, therefore, a sense from many civil society advocates that the demand for 
OGD was in part DUHDFWLRQWRWKHVHPXOWLSOHFULVHVRIWKH8.¶VQHROLEHUDOVWDWHDQGD
FLWL]HQV¶PRYHPHQWWRZUHVWFRQWUROIURPDSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFHOLWHWKDWFRXOGQRWEH
trusted. OGD was presented as a partial solution to enhance democratic participation, 
innovation, public sector governance and economic equality in response to some of the key 
issues with neoliberal governance in the UK as outlined above. 
However, whilst OGD was perceived by these advocates as a means of empowering 
citizens beyond the confines of the neoliberal state, for many of the state-based advocates a 
primary motivation was to (re)build trust in the neoliberal form of state. As Worthy (2010) 
has argued, access to some form of government information has been a cornerstone of the UK 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VDWWHPSWWRUHYHUVHWKHIUDJPHQWLQJWUXVWRIFLWL]HQVLQJRYHUQPHQWLQVWLWXWLRQV
for well over a decade. For these state-based advocates, some concessions to transparency 
and participation were deemed to be required in order to (re)build consent for the neoliberal 
agenda: 
,W¶VIXQGDPHQWDOO\DSROLWLFDOLQLWLDWLYHGULYHQLQODUJHSDUWE\HOHFWHGSROLWLFLDQV¶
view that trust in government can only be maintained these days if government is 
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PRUHRSHQDQGWUDQVSDUHQWDQGWKDW¶VZK\SROLWLFLDQVDUHSUHSDUHGWREHVR
masochistic about it (Andrew Stott, former Director for Transparency and Digital 
(QJDJHPHQW&DELQHW2IILFH³&KDOOHQJLQJ2SHQQHVV´VHVVLRQ)XWXUH(YHU\WKLQJ
conference, Manchester, 2011). 
Related to the desire to generate citizen trust in public authorities, a number of state 
based interviewees discussed efforts to increase citizen engagement and participation with 
SXEOLFERGLHV7KHVHFRQVWUXFWLRQVRIFLWL]HQHQJDJHPHQWILW/LQGHUV¶W\SRORJ\RI
citizen co-production. In some cases the type of citizen engagement articulated related to the 
development of public services i.e. the execution of services by citizens via a variety of 
HQJDJHPHQWPRGHOVLQFOXGLQJµFLWL]HQVRXUFLQJ¶µJRYHUQPHQWDVSODWIRUP¶DQGµ',<
JRYHUQPHQW¶/LQGHUV,QRWKHULQVWDQFHVSDUWicipation was constructed as citizens 
holding public bodies to account, for example, through scrutinising spending data; framed by 
/LQGHUVDVFLWL]HQPRQLWRULQJRIJRYHUQPHQWYLDDµJRYHUQPHQWDVSODWIRUP¶PRGHO
To a lesser extent participation was OLQNHGWRFLWL]HQRUPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\³GLJLWDO
GLVUXSWHU´HQJDJHPHQWLQSROLF\GHYHORSPHQW- in Linders¶ W\SRORJ\µFLWL]HQVRXUFLQJ¶WKH
design and execution of services - for example, in the case of the interaction between 
developers and public officials in the development of the London Datastore (Coleman, 2011).  
Whilst at a surface level these ideas seem to resonate with OGD advocates¶ demands 
for increased democratic and civic engagement,  citizen co-production in UK centre-right 
political ideology is generally constructed as a form of small-state civic localism; an ideology 
ZKLFKHQMR\HGDEULHIEUDQGLQJDVWKHµ%LJ6RFLHW\¶GXULQJWKHILUVWWZR\HDUV-12) of 
the current government. Two critical examples of this form of co-production in practice 
include the significant increase in dependency on volunteer-led food banks in the UK as 
welfare services are cut, and an increase in volunteer-run libraries as state-funded public 
libraries face closure. Thus at a deeper level there appears to be diveUJHQFHEHWZHHQFLWL]HQV¶
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GHPDQGVIRU2*'LQIRUPHGGHPRFUDWLFDQGFLYLFSDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGWKHRXWFRPHVRIWKHµ%LJ
6RFLHW\¶IRUPRIFR-production, which may impact uncertainly on trust development into the 
future. 
Consistent with ideas and practices interconnecting the promotion of trust, 
transparency, participation and OGD, one of the first policy moves of the new government in 
May 2010 was an announcement by Prime Minister David Cameron that a new Public Sector 
Transparency Board, comprising of a number of high profile OGD advocates, was being 
formed. Further, he announced that a number of key transparency related datasets were to be 
released as open datasets, including the COINS Treasury spending database, and datasets of 
all government departmental spending over £25,000 and all local government spending over 
,WFDQEHDUJXHGWKDWWKLVLPPHGLDWHIRFXVRIWKHQHZµ7UDQVSDUHQF\$JHQGD¶RQ
opening public sector spending data indicates some overlap between OGD policy and the 
broader government agenda of fiscal austerity, rather than a more general notion of state 
transparency, accountability, and citizen engagement. Again, the impact of this tension on 
long-term trust generation is uncertain; however, as Halonen (2012, p. 93) argues, during the 
early phaseVRIWKH2*'LQLWLDWLYHDWOHDVWWKHGHYHORSPHQWRID³KLJKOHYHORIPXWXDOWUXVW
EHWZHHQDXWKRULWLHVDQG>2*'@GHYHORSHUV´ZDVHYLGHQW 
In terms of the strategic importance of information policy (Braman, 2011) to the 
FRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHFULVHVRIWKH8.¶VQHROLEHUDOVWDWHWKH2*'
transparency policy can be understood as the critical first-move of a new government coming 
to power during a deepening crisis of consent for the neoliberal form of governance. It should 
therefore be questioneGZKHWKHUWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V³WUDQVSDUHQF\´LQLWLDWLYHLVLQDFWXDOLW\
motivated by a desire to increase the legitimacy of, and trust in, sections of the political class, 
DWWKHVDPHWLPHDVWXUQLQJFLWL]HQV¶FULWLFDOJD]HXSRQWKHSXEOLFVHUYLFHVWKDWWKHVH same 
political actors are in the process of subjecting to austerity and marketization policies, as will 
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be explored in section 5.2. As one civil society advocate observed, some contexts and types 
of transparency initiative might function to intensify the breakdown in trust between citizens 
DQGWKHEURDGHUSXEOLFVHFWRUOHDGLQJWRFRQVHQWIRUQHROLEHUDOSROLWLFLDQVWRIXUWKHU³KROORZ
RXWWKHVWDWH´,QWHUYLHZ3HULSKHUDO&LYLO6RFLHW\ 
5.2 Public services data and the Open Public Services Agenda  
The new JRYHUQPHQWLQDZD\WKH\¶YHNLQGRIKLMDFNHGWKHWUDQVSDUHQF\DJHQGDWR
kind of....pull apart the public sector, in a way (Interviews: Peripheral Civil Society). 
7KHSROLWLFDOHFRQRPLFFRQWH[WWKDWWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VWUDQVSDUHQF\LQLWLDWLYHLV
being developed within is one of public spending cuts and a deepening of the neoliberal 
marketization agenda. The Making Open Data Real consultation, which opened in August 
SRVLWLRQHGWKHRSHQLQJRIGDWDDQGWUDQVSDUHQF\DVSRVVLEO\³WKHPRVWSRZHUIXOOHvers 
RIVWFHQWXU\SXEOLFSROLF\´(HM Government, 2011c, p. 8). The consultation framed the 
SRWHQWLDORIRSHQLQJJRYHUQPHQWGDWDGLUHFWO\ZLWKLQWKH&RDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW¶V
controversial Open Public Services agenda. The Open Public Services White Paper (HM 
Government, 2011d), which is now a national government policy agenda, proposes to open 
the provision of all public services apart from the judiciary and the security services to 
competition from the private and third sectors.  Within the Making Open Data Real 
FRQVXOWDWLRQSDSHU2*'ZDVIUDPHGKHDYLO\DVEHLQJGDWDDERXWSXEOLFVHUYLFHV³7KLVSDSHU
SURSRVHVWRFRYHUGDWDUHODWLQJWRSURYLVLRQRIµSXEOLFVHUYLFHV¶IRRWQRWHLQOLQHZLWKWKH
UHFHQW2SHQ3XEOLF6HUYLFHV:KLWH3DSHU´(HM Government, 2011c, p. 14). The 
FRQVXOWDWLRQSDSHUSURSRVHGWKDW³DOOGDWDUHODWLQJWRWKHSURYLVLRQRISXEOLFVHUYLFHV´ZRXOG
EHRSHQHGDQGWKLVZRXOGLQFOXGHGDWDRQ³DFFHVVWRVHUYLFHVXVHUVDWLVIDFWLRQVSHQGLQJ
SHUIRUPDQFHDQGHTXDOLW\´(HM Government, 2011c, p. 13). Whilst in certain political 
economic contexts such a move might signal an initiative to deepen the democratic 
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governance of public services, the present context of these data releases in the UK is one of 
an increasingly market-orientated model of public service provision in which the public are 
framed as consumers of services. 
As one local government interviewee explained, through opening up data about public 
services citizens can become better informed in the choices they make as consumers of public 
services: 
,WVRSHQLQJXSWKHFKRLFHIRUSHRSOHWKHUH¶VDQDSSZKHUH\RX¶YHJRWDOOWKHFDUH
homes and you can go on there and you can check what was the last rating of this? 
And, how clean is it? And, what are your chances of getting MRSA in a particular 
hospital? And that coupled with - again - some of the government legislation on 
opening up choice to people (Interviews: Local government). 
Beyond informing citizen-consumer choice in a marketized public sector, it should 
also be recognised that much of the data being opened, i.e. spending, quality, satisfaction, and 
performance, is precisely the kind of data that business intelligence analysts may find 
valuable when evaluating whether a firm should bid to run a public service. Such activity 
could therefoUHFRQWULEXWHWRWKHSUDFWLFHRI³FKHUU\-SLFNLQJ´SURILWDEOHVHUYLFHVWRWDNHRYHU
by private providers that is already common in public service provision. For example, those 
medical procedures most likely to be carried out by private health providers in the UK tend to 
be low risk yet high value (see Department of Health, 2012, p. 168-170), meaning that firms 
are likely to profit, but public providers lose out by not being able to use the income 
generated from these procedures to subsidize more complex cases. The relationship between 
OGD and such trends therefore merits further exploration. 
In order to push forward the agenda of opening up public service data the Prime 
Minister announced a significant data release in July 2011. This announcement included the 
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release of some National Health Service (NHS) data including General Practitioner (family 
doctor) clinical outcomes, prescriptions, hospital complaints, clinical audit, and staff 
satisfaction. The release of National Health Service data indicates the strategic importance of 
OGD to WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVWUXFWXULQJRIKHDOWKSURYLVLRQLQWKH8.LQOLQHZLWKSURSRVDOV
articulated in the Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS White Paper (HM Government, 
2010) and the controversial Health and Social Care Act 2012 which came into force on 1st 
April 2013. This government intervention, similar to the more general Open Public Services 
DJHQGDDLPVWRGHYHORSFRPSHWLWLYHPDUNHWVZLWKLQWKH8.¶VKHDOWKVHUYLFHZKLFKKDVEHHQ
publicly funded and provided since the NHS was founded in 1948). The advent of such 
markets would mean public providers competing with the private and third sector to provide 
health services in a data informed market (HM Government, 2010). Furthermore, data 
regarding the prescribing practices by brand of NHS General Practitioners (family doctors) 
has been opened, without public comment that in an effort to curb the influence of 
pharmaceutical companies' marketing strategies on prescribing practices, some jurisdictions 
in the United States have tried (and failed, following a 2011 US Supreme Court decision - 
6RUUHOOY,06+HDOWKWRSURKLELWWKH³VHOOLQJOLFHQVLQJ«H[FKDQJLQJ>RIVLPLODUGDWD@«>RU
LWV@XVHIRUGUXJSURPRWLRQ´(Mello & Messing, 2011). 
Whilst Dunleavy and Margetts (2010) argue that a new era of Digital Era Governance 
has superseded practices of New Public Management, others are more sceptical about the 
relationship between emerging digital agendas such as OGD and NPM (Longo, 2011). It is 
evident from the analysis above that OGD has a significant enabling role LQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
broader agenda of marketizing public service provision in the UK; a policy that overlaps with 
the neoliberal New Public Management framework outlined in section 3, and which provides 
PRUHHYLGHQFHLQVXSSRUWRI%UDPDQ¶VDUJXPHQWUHJDUGing the strategic importance of 
information policy in the leveraging of contemporary state power. 
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5.3 Trading Fund data and the potential for privatization 
Beyond the marketization of public services, the privatization of major public assets is 
also on the JRYHUQPHQW¶VDJHQGD,QWKH8.7UDGLQJ)XQGVDUHDIRUPRISXEOLFVHFWRU
commercial organisation, some of which are responsible for critical data collection and 
information production activities. Whilst the rules around each Trading Fund differ, they all 
must make a substantial part of their income from commercial activities, rather than 
depending solely on direct public funding. They include public organizations such as 
Ordnance Survey (the national mapping authority) and The Met Office (meteorology).  
The rules around third party re-use of the basic data that these Trading Funds collect 
has been an issue on the agenda of some corporate lobbies and government policy makers for 
DQXPEHURI\HDUV7KHDPHQGPHQWVWRWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶V(8'LUHFtive on 
the Re-use of Public Sector Information make a demand on public bodies to allow marginal 
cost (often zero for digital data) re-use of their data with limited exceptions. At the time of 
writing, The National Archives (TNA), the public body responsible for regulating the re-use 
of public sector information in the UK and transposing the EU Directive, were negotiating on 
behalf of the UK for exclusions on marginal cost charging for Trading Funds (The National 
Archives, 2013, p. 2). Whilst it is claimed E\71$WKDWWKLVH[FOXVLRQ³NHHSVZLWKLQWKHVSLULW
RIWKHRSHQGDWDDQGWUDQVSDUHQF\DJHQGD´LQIDFWLWDYRLGVDOHJLVODWLYHGHPDQGWR³RSHQ´
WKHGDWDWKDWLVSURGXFHGE\7UDGLQJ)XQGVDVSDUWRIWKHLU³SXEOLFWDVN´LQIDYRXURID
commercialised form of GDWDSURGXFWLRQDQGGLVWULEXWLRQIRUPDQ\³FRUHUHIHUHQFH´GDWDVHWV 
At the same time as this exclusion is being negotiated, however, major data releases 
RI³FRUHUHIHUHQFHGDWD´IURP7UDGLQJ)XQGVOLFHQFHGIRUUH-use under the Open Government 
Licence, have taken place, which appear to be aimed at unleashing market forces in key 
sectors of the economy. These include substantial volumes of weather data from the Met 
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2IILFH³SULFHSDLG´GDWDIRUUHVLGHQWLDOSURSHUW\VDOHVDQGWUDQVDFWLRQDOGDWDWKDWFDQLQGicate 
potential housing market movements from the Land Registry; the CodePoint postcode 
database and a range of core mapping datasets from Ordnance Survey; and, a bulk download 
dataset of company names, numbers, registered addresses and further basic information from 
Companies House (HM Government, 2011b, p. 10-11).  
7KH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQRIQHJRWLDWLQJIRU7UDGLQJ)XQGVWREHDEOHWRFKDUJH
for the re-use of data they produce has changed little since the original discussions about the 
EU Directive on the Re-use of Public Sector Information in the early 2000s (Interviews: Civil 
Service). However, current policy makers also seemingly perceive possible market benefits in 
strategically opening specific datasets such as weather forecasting and house price data; 
datasets which undoubtedly have significant value for specific types of commercial actors as 
will be explored in section 5.4 for the case of weather data.  
Beyond avoiding an impact on the revenue streams and governance of the commercial 
Trading Funds by retaining the charge option in the amended Directive, the reluctance to 
move towards a fully open model for non-value added datasets produced by Trading Funds 
also needs to be contextualised within possible moves to privatise a number of these public 
bodies.  In 2011 there was an attempt to draw a number of the high profile Trading Funds 
LQWRDVLQJOH3XEOLF'DWD&RUSRUDWLRQDSURFHVVWKDWDLPHGWRPHHWWKHREMHFWLYHRI³FUHDWLQJ
DYHKLFOHWKDWFDQDWWUDFWSULYDWHLQYHVWPHQW´(HM Government, 2011a, p. 6), and which one 
senior civil servant interviewee perceived as unexplainable other than as a precursor to 
privatization. Yet, whilst the Public Data Corporation plans were abandoned in 2012, the 
*XDUGLDQQHZVSDSHUUHSRUWHGLQ$SULOWKDW³0LQLVWHUVbelieve several [public] assets are 
ripe for sale now stock markets have returned to their pre-crash peaks, and investors are ready 
to make long-WHUPFRPPLWPHQWV´2IWKRVHDVVHWVEHLQJFRQVLGHUHGIRUSULYDWLzation, it 
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reports, are Companies House, the Land Registry, the Met Office and Ordnance Survey 
(Inman & Harvey, 2013). 
It is clear that applying Open Licences to all non-value added Trading Fund datasets 
would make these public bodies significantly less valuable assets during any privatization. As 
in the case of the recent privatization of Royal Mail, the inclusion of the Postcode Address 
File database in the sell-off has been estimated to be worth between £500-900 million (Hope, 
2013)7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVHHPLQJGHVLUHWRSULYDWLVHNH\7UDGLQJ)XQGVZKilst also opening 
up datasets of value to powerful sectors of the UK economy, provides further evidence of a 
broadly neoliberal agenda shaping policy decisions in the UK. In relation to the strategic 
importance of information policy, key decisions appear to be being taken by policy makers to 
balance the opening of Trading Fund data to boost key economic sectors, such as finance and 
housing, WKDWWKH8.¶VQHROLEHUDOJURZWKPRGHOLVGHSHQGHQWXSRQZKLOVWQRWGDPDJLQJWKH
potential short term financial value for the Treasury that could be generated through the 
privatization of valuable information assets.  
5.4 Financial market expansion: weather data and the exploitation of risk 
Since it is the intention of the UK government not to have a general policy of opening 
all Trading Fund data, it is therefore important to consider the strategic importance of 
opening specific datasets, and the benefits for various political and economic actors. In order 
to illustrate some of the potential issues at play in these decisions, the case of opening 
weather data produced by the Met Office will be used. 
The 2011 Autumn Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, 
DQQRXQFHGWKDWWKH0HW2IILFHZRXOGEHUHOHDVLQJ³WKHODUJHVWYROXPHRIKLJKTXDOLW\
weather data and information made available by a national meteorological organisation 
DQ\ZKHUHLQWKHZRUOG´XQGHUDQ2SHQ*RYHUQPHQW/LFHQFH(HM Government, 2011b). The 
22 
 
release of such data will be exploitable by a range of interests including commercial weather 
forecasting services. More significant in relation to the continuation of the neoliberal state, 
however, is the potential for re-use of this weather data within the financial services industry, 
in particular by firms engaged in the weather derivatives markets.  
Weather derivatives were developed within the US energy industry by Enron, Koch 
Industries and Aquila in the mid-1990s when Enron found insurance companies unwilling to 
insure the company against non-extreme weather events (WRMA, n.d. (a); Dischel, 2002). 
Whilst weather derivative contracts are traded across all forms of weather event, by far the 
most popular contracts are based on temperature and the divergence of the average daily 
temperature from 18ͼC (WRMA, n.d. (b)). 
The weather derivatives market saw massive growth in the mid-2000s, experiencing 
both the hedge fund boom of 2005-6, when the total notional value of trades reached a high 
of $45 billion/annum, and the pre-crash boom of 2007-8 ($32 billion/annum) (PwC, 2006; 
WRMA, 2008; Randalls, 2010). As with other forms of financial product, however, the 
vulnerability of the weather derivatives market was highlighted when the market crashed 
during 2008-9 ($15 billion/annum) and 2009-10 ($10 billion/annum), with only slow signs of 
growth by 2011 ($12billion/annum) (McCallion, 2011; WRMA, 2009; WRMA, 2011). 
However, the Weather Risk Management Association  is hopeful for weather derivatives, 
pointing to continuing growth outside the US markets throughout the downturn, growing 
interest in non-temperature-related weather derivatives, and increasing interest from outside 
the energy industry (WRMA, 2009; WRMA, 2011). 
Until recently, UK based traders had to purchase their weather data from the Met 
Office in order to conduct forecast analyses and price weather derivatives contracts. Weiss 
(2002) argues that by 2002 the limited access to weather data in the EU had resulted in a 
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weather risk management industry 13.5 times smaller than the then embryonic US industry 
which had built up $9.7 billion dollars of contract value over 5 years, based on data freely 
available from US public bodies. The UK financial services sector has long complained that 
the weather risk and derivatives markets in the UK have been restrained by the lack of freely 
available weather data, and accordingly have lobbied for a data access and re-use policy 
similar to the USA (BERR, 2008; Interviews: Civil Service). The decision of the UK 
JRYHUQPHQWWRµRSHQ¶ODUJHYROXPHVRIPHWHRURORJLFDOGDWDLVWKHUHIRUHVLJQLILFDQWDQGLV
further suggestive of OGD policy being used to enable a broader government strategy, in this 
case as a means of deepening the neoliberal financialization agenda.  
Whilst the claim is often made that weather derivatives and similar products balance 
out the financial impact of weather instabilities on affected businesses, thus smoothing 
adaptation to climate change, serious questions do arise about who actually benefits from 
these financial products. During a time of instability in global weather systems, there is a lot 
of potential profit to be generated from such financial products. This developing data-driven 
weather derivatives market is one that exploits common threats in order to generate private 
wealth, and could reduce the incentive for those profiting in these markets to engage in action 
to mitigate climate change.  
7KHµRSHQLQJ¶RIZHDWKHUGDWDWRIXHOWKH8.ZHDWKHUGHULYDWLYHVPDUNHWWKHUHIRUH
SRLQWVWRWKHFRQWLQXLQJHYHQGHHSHQLQJSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFSRZHURIWKH8.¶VILQDQFLDO
sector post-crash, and the importance of information policy in strengthening the role of the 
sector through promoting financialization strategies as a response to common threats such as 
climate change. Indeed, in the Open Data White Paper, the UK government stressed that its 
interest in OGD was also about stimulating growth in  the broader risk industry including in 
WKHDUHDVRI³KRPHODQGVHFXULW\«GLVDVWHUPDQDJHPHQWHQHUJ\DQGIRRGVHFXULW\´(HM 
Government, 2011c, p. 53). 
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6. Information policy and the neoliberal state 
The re-use of public sector information has, until recently, been a relatively obscure 
policy domain. Whilst the growing interest in Open Government Data has drawn more 
attention to the topic, beyond the surface level it remains clouded by technicalities and the 
interrelations with other policy areas are not fully explored in the literature, particularly from 
critical perspectives. As Braman (2006, SDUJXHVLWFDQEHLOOXPLQDWLQJWR³ORRNZKHUHWKH
OLJKWGRQ¶WVKLQH´LQRUGHUWRJHWDEHWWHUDSSUHFLDWLRQIRUWKHLQIOXHQFHRILQIRUPDWLRQSROLF\
on broader policy and societal developments. This article, therefore, aimed to begin to 
analyse how one form of information policy (OGD) has played an important strategic role in 
WKH8.FRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW¶VIRUPXODWLRQRIDPRUHJHQHUDOSXEOLFSROLF\IUDPHZRUN 
The opening up of government data can be interpreted as an amelioration of the trend 
towards proprietization and commercialization of information during the neoliberal era, and a 
shift towards a more co-productive relationship between citizens and the state. However, the 
broader analysis presented here suggests that the Open Government Data agenda is also being 
used strategically, and often insidiously, by the UK government to fuel a range of broader 
and more controversial policies, which are aimed at the continuation of the neoliberal form of 
state through the current crisis. In particular, the article examined the relationship between 
Open Government Data policy and the market-orientated neoliberal objectives of the 
marketization of public services and potential privatization of public assets, the leveraging of 
financial markets and pharmaceutical industries through selective release of particular 
datasets, and the embedding of OGD into a broader agenda aimed at (re)building trust in 
political elites. 
7KHVHILQGLQJVWKHUHIRUHHYLGHQFHVRPHDFFXUDF\LQ%UDPDQ¶V(2006) observation that 
³JRYHUQPHQWVGHliberately, explicitly, and consistently control information creation, 
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SURFHVVLQJIORZVDQGXVHWRH[HUFLVHSRZHU´SE\³PDQLSXODWLQJWKHLQIRUPDWLRQDOEDVHV
RILQVWUXPHQWDOVWUXFWXUDODQGV\PEROLFSRZHU´S+RZHYHUZKHWKHUWKLVDQGVLPLODU
REVHUYDWLRQVLQGLFDWHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDQ³LQIRUPDWLRQDOVWDWH´LVPRUHFRQWHQWLRXVVLQFH
such a framework diverts analytical attention away from the forms of production and social 
relations that these information policy processes aim to reproduce or generate. In other 
ZRUGVWKHQRWLRQRIDQ³LQIRUPDWLRQDOVWDWH´PLJKWXVHIXOO\LQGLFDWHLPSRUWDQWWUHQGVLQWKH
process of governing by states, but it provides no indication of the ends to which these 
decisions are directed. Whilst such a focus is not necessarily problematic in itself, to define 
the state and frame the analysis only in relation to these political processes might limit a 
deeper understanding of the role of information policy in broader political economic 
GHYHORSPHQWV,QWKHFDVHRIWKH8.¶VOGD initiative, for example, the overall ends of the 
coalition government can be understood as the continuation of a neoliberal capitalist form of 
VWDWHWKURXJKDSHULRGRIFULVLV%UDPDQ¶V³LQIRUPDWLRQDOVWDWH´IUDPHZRUNZLWKLWVHPSKDVLV
on political power, does not introduce this layer to the analysis, however, it is a crucial aspect 
of attempting to understand better the strategic role that information policy is playing in the 
8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHFULVLVRIWKHQHROLEHUDOVWDWH:LWKRXWWKLV layer of analysis 
it is difficult to make the connections between marketization, privatization, financial market 
activity, corporate welfare, political governance and trust, and developments in information 
policy around the re-use of public sector data as advanced by the UK government.  
In light of these findings and arguments, a number of recommendations for further 
research are made. There has so far been little critical research into the OGD agenda; further 
such research on these initiatives in both national and international contexts would be 
beneficial. Specific areas for development include the intersection of OGD policies with a 
range of political and economic agendas, how opened government data is being used in a 
range of industry contexts (some of which are suggested in the above discussion) and under 
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what regulatory frameworks, the decision making processes around the opening (or, not) of 
specific datasets deemed to be of political, economic and social value, and comparative 
research on the broader strategic use of OGD policies in different political economic 
contexts. 
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